News received from Beijing report a loan of US$ 15 bi to Petróleo Brasileiro S.A., Petrobras, by the Chinese Development Bank(CDB). The purpose would be to contribute to the exploration of petroleum in the pre-salt layer. The counterpart would be a 200 thousand barrel/day of oil for 10 years. The Brazilian company would offer the state petroleum company, Sinopec, a participation in the exploration of oil in the stretch of the continental platform along the coast of Maranhão and Pará. It would be a new and interesting area to be explored. It must be noted that the CDB also granted recently a loan of US$ 25 bi to Russia, for the supply of 300 thousand barrel/day for twenty years.

The two movements from China constitute a part of a strategic game to meet the increasing consumption of energy. Since its consumption depends greatly on coal, which is abundant there, Chinese demand for petroleum grows every year. According to the IEA (International Energy Agency), Chinese petroleum consumption is 7.4 million bpd, of which 3.6 million bpd is imported. About 50% comes from the Middle East. Transport is maritime: the tankers navigate the Indic Ocean to reach the South China Sea, pass preferably through the Malacca Straights, which divides Indonesia from Thailand, from Malaysia and Singapore. There are other less used passages, Lombok and Sunda. It is a long sea line of communication (SLC), which would be vulnerable to any instability in the Indic or the straights. Apart from this possibility, the distance determines high cots of freight and insurance.

Another Chinese initiative is the obtention of petroleum extracted offshore, in the South China Sea. However, there is a problem: in various areas, there is coastal state disagreement. The multilateral reference instrument is the Convention of the UN for Sea Rights, alias the Jamaica Convention, where it was signed. One part covers jurisdictional waters;  in this case an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) giving each state 200 nautical miles. That is the continental platform of each state projects itself on the seabed to this distance, from the shore. The simple application of this rule overlaps the EEZ of two or more states. However, the convention recommends, here, that countries should establish bilateral agreements - or multilateral, if the case - to define the jurisdictional water limits of each one. China claims sovereignty over nearly all the South China Sea, for historical reasons. Therefore, it does not recognize the application of the convention for that sea. That is why there are suits about the possession of the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, where there are proven petroleum reserves. In addition, there is the presence of oil companies from various countries, including from outside Asia.

A third initiative for getting oil abroad is importing from Central Asia. In this case, there are agreements with Russia and regional states. These agreements run with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China, Russia, Kazaquistan, Quirguistan, Tadjiquistan and Uzbequistan are part. China’s intention is to conclude the execution of a duct to transport oil and gas from the Caspian Sea to the Chinese province of Xinjiang Uygur. From this province, to the dense industrialized areas of the East, there is a duct of 3.900 km, which links the sources of existing Chinese exploration in Xinjiang Uygur. The province has a vast area of 1.71 million km², i.e., more than a 1/5 of all the country’s area. It is rich in non-ferrous metals and oil in the basin of Tarim. Those with gas reserves reach 220 bi cubic meters (m³) and 40 millions tons of petroleum.

Xinjiang has a population of approximately 20 million inhabitants, a small part of 1.336 billion Chinese (census 2008). Therefore there are about 12 people per km². There is an important population contingent in Xinjiang made up of the ethnic minority Uygur. The Uygur are farmers who work on the lands around the Tarim basin and on the fringes of the Gobi desert. They have the typical features of people from Central Asia. They profess Islamism, present in other neighboring republics to the province. There are reports of insurgency against the central Beijing government. The protests would have logistic support from its neighbor Afghanistan under Taliban rule. For Beijing, it is a discomfort. After all, the low population density of a province neighboring several Muslim states - some politically instable – and rich in hydrocarbons, like Xinjiang, could subject it to exogenous influences. In addition, the long line of ducts could be vulnerable to protests using force. Probably, this is one of the reasons why the central government tries to thicken the presence of the ethnic majority, Han, by way of occupying state positions. 

There is a permanent preoccupation by the authorities of countries which have demographic gaps, mainly with superlative lands. In the case of Brazil, the state presence in regions like Amazonia is no doubt a challenge. Legal Amazonia corresponds to 59% of all the territory of Brazil, according to Brazilian Geography and Statistical Institute, (IBGE). A populational density of about 3.3 inhabitants per km². More than 69% of the population lives in urban zones, according to the IBGE.  As publicly known, the biodiversity is one of the greatest in the world. In addition, various mineral provinces have been mapped including oil. However, the presence of the Brazilian state there is weak and localized. The sparse population is sparingly taken care of by it. It is therefore vulnerable to initiative strange to national projects. In addition, if we focus on Indian reserves, with a much lower density than in other Legal Amazonia regions, the Brazilian state sees the problem aggravated. Finally, Brazilians who insist in occupying our vast Amazon hinterland have to travel in shaky boats for days to get to hospital. Alternatively, they do not have the money to register their children, future non-citizens. However, they continue to nurture the conviction of belonging to one people only. 

However, a Blue Amazonia, which points to the sea, also has a similar challenge to that of Green Amazonia. The continental platform that corresponds to the state of Pará stretches to about 350 NM beyond the coast to the mouth of the Amazon River. To reserve the benefits of the exploration of mineral sites there is for Brazilians another of our State’s jobs. Even more so when the possibility of joint hydrocarbons in the platforms subsoil is shown, as mentioned at the beginning of this article.  

The comparison of Legal Amazonia with the Chinese provincial of Xinjiang can seem a strange exercise. They are in fact, two geographic different universes and societies, which keep their own traits. However, the challenges before the national Brazilian and Chinese states keep similarities: reaffirm their sovereignty over the territory to maintain its integrity; and take the institutions to the populations by way of initiatives that satisfy them adequately. They demand cyclopic tasks, pertaining to peoples who do not belittle themselves.