Saying that Beijing intends to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake became a common view in Southeast Asia. Which, to some extent is not an exaggeration at all. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea make it a perilous flashpoint where a myriad of interests and variables are intimately interlaced. Moreover, the PRC has been playing hard to assure its interests in that region.

The South China Sea extends from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. Over 500 million people in China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam live within 100 miles of its coastline. The disputes are concentrated on the claims of six states. China and Taiwan claiming almost the entirely area, while Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines are claiming only portions of it. However, what makes the South China Sea important for such differing states as giant China and smaller Brunei? There is no a single response to this question. The reasons for the territorial claims in the South China Sea encompass such historical aspects as nationalism, strategic and economic interests and a certain level of jurisdiction opportunism.

Historically the South China Sea has been the subject of disputes and indefinition since the colonial period. Between the 12th century and 15th century, it was intensely used by the Chinese merchant fleet as maritime trade route with the then vassal states in the region. However, suddenly, obeying orders from the Emperor, the Chinese navy withdrew its naval fleet from the oceans causing the first vacuum in terms of sovereignty in the South China Sea and one the most radical decisions of all Chinese history. Later, the consolidation of the European supremacy became a reality with the massive presence of Dutch, French and the British empires. The first was hegemonic operating from Formosa (Taiwan) and Batavia (Indonesia) territories, building a strong hub of a lucrative maritime trade route until the 18th century. The 19th century was characterized by the dominance of the French and British empires, in which the latter was responsible for the Opium War in 1839-1842, when it took over Hong Kong from China. France established colonies in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and later occupied several islands in the South China Sea, initiating an intense dispute with China that only ended with the rose of the Japanese empire in the begin of the 20th century. Finally, in 1939 Japan definitely included the islands and archipelagos in the South China Sea under its dominance. As Tokyo since 1895 had also taken Formosa (Taiwan) as result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) from China, its control over the South China Sea was almost absolute.

All developments imposed by World War II and principally with its end completely changed the panorama of the South China Sea question. Five events helped to shape the contemporary disputes: 1) the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from all its possessions in the Pacific, which also affected Southeast Asia; 2) the Chinese Civil War; 3) the decolonization process; 4) the discovery of potential oil and gas reserves in the region; and 5) the establishment of the United Nations Convention of Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in 1973.

The territorial ownership vacuums left by the Japanese were immediately claimed by Nationalist China in 1947, that later reinforced its claims from Taiwan given its defeat to communist forces led by Mao in 1949. In 1951, the legendary Zhou Enlai also emphasized the communist claims over the region using the same arguments previously elaborated by the Kuomintang. The “two Chinas” were now claiming maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea. However, the process gained complexity with the decolonization initiated with the end of the conflicts in the Pacific. The independence of the Philippines in 1946 and Vietnam in 1950 added two more players to the question. The new Vietnamese state, even though deeply mired in a civil war that resulted in the victory of the north in 1975, laid claims on the former French colonial possessions as an integral part of the Vietnamese historical territory that included the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. In 1956, based on the discoveries of the Cloma brothers explorers the Philippines also drafted its claims, which encompassed part of Spratly Islands that were renamed as the Philippine name, Kallaayan. The Philippine initiative led all other claimants to react violently against it. The leader of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the occupation of the Itu Aba Island (the largest one) as way of guaranteeing the Taiwanese sovereignty claims. The PRC and Vietnam also responded vigorously, occupying groups of islets and reefs in Spratly and Paracel.

In parallel with all these events, British and American companies started to discuss the possibility of the existence of oil and gas reserves in Spratly Island and adjacent areas. Even though inconclusive at that time, the potential existence of petroleum triggered a sequence of nationalist demonstrations in the entire region, but principally in China and Vietnam. Consequently, a new discussion regarding the extension of the continental shelf and the interpretations if it would or not guarantee rights of sovereignty gained muscle. With the advent of the oil variable, the South China Sea disputes now had historical claims connected to the decolonization and legal question. Moreover, in 1973 with the advent of the first oil crisis, the debate reached an intense point, which among other questions led to the establishment of the United Nation Convention of Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III). The UNCLOS’ discussions legislated on a variety of aspects of maritime rights and were remarkably important to solve a variety of different maritime territorial disputes around the globe. However, to the South China Sea question, the UNCLOS only added more fuel to the fire. The UNCLOS’ discussions about the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 200 nautical miles brought two more players to the dispute, Malaysia and Brunei. Based on the UNCLOS recommendations about the continental shelf and EEZ, these two states developed claims on portions of the South China Sea and Spratly Islands. 

All these events in different measures and levels of importance make up the current portrayal of the disputes. They are basic variables for any person interested in Asia-Pacific dynamics, in understanding the complexities of the disputes in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it is a requisite for anyone that intends to follow all the developments in one of the most intricate diplomatic knots in the world.

Regarding the role of China, none of these really matters. After the “century of humiliation” (between 1839 until 1949), the recomposition of the “motherland”, taking back all territories lost it during these period is a national imperative. That is the reason that the PRC claims the entire South China Sea. 

Hence, the (re)annexation of those “lost” territories are necessary parts of the reaffirmation of the CCP as legitimate leader of this process that consequently bolsters its position as leader of the Chinese people. Thus, it does not matter whence the arguments of its neighbors in Southeast Asia come, from the Chinese standpoint there is no legitimatization in any other claims and it has been acting in a serious way in these regard. The occupations of the Paracel Islands over Vietnam in 1974, the Mischief Reef in 1995 over Philippines are, among others, the clearest demonstrations of Beijing’s assertiveness regarding its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.

Nevertheless, there are more variables that this article does not yet contemplate. We have external players with important interests involved in the disputes between Southeast Asian states and China. The United States and Japan have special interests in that area as well. However, this topic is to be explored in another future article.