The last article provided an historical overview on the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. It also delineated the basic point of the analytical need to have a clear understanding of the disputes and their diplomatic and strategic complexities. Now, this article aims to complete the analytical portrait highlighting the role of two important external players: the United States and Japan.

Recently at the Asian Regional Security Meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton broke one of the most consistent U.S. foreign policy principles towards Southeast Asia: the non-involvement in the South China Sea (SCS) maritime disputes. Secretary Clinton stressed that although the United States remains neutral with regard to the dispute itself, the preservation of free shipping in the area is part of U.S. national interests and that the U.S. would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the issue. Clinton’s assertiveness is in complete contrast with the United States’ usual approach to the South China Sea issue. In a 1996 statement related to the U.S. presence and interests, it was made very clear that the U.S. is committed to non-involvement in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It argues that “The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea”. In addition, the statement also highlighted that “the United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law”.

The U.S. interests in the South China Sea obey a series of national and global variables. Ultimately, the amalgamation of these multiple interests is characterized in the concept of freedom of navigation that was initiated in 18th century but particularly intensified since World War II. During the war, the U.S. made certain steps to eliminate the Japanese sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea that linked all Southeast Asia to China and Japan. Since then, the navigational freedom in the region has been a permanent and definitive part of U.S. strategic interests. However, the Chinese official stance that the status of the South China Sea is one of China’s “core interests”, puts in peril this freedom of navigation that has guided U.S. actions in the region.

Various U.S. officials reinforced this concept of free access in any maritime domain several times. For example, in 2001 the U.S. Department of Defense released a report stating the key elements where the its armed forces should undertake all efforts to protect, among them the access to key strategic-areas in ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action, protection of critical infrastructure; contributing to economic well-being, including the vitality and productivity of the global economy. Furthermore, the United States concept also includes aspects related to security of international sea, air, space, and information lines of communication, and, last but not least, access to key markets and strategic resources.

In fact, the Asia-Pacific region and South China Sea area are inextricably linked with the U.S. national interests listed above. The region encompasses some priorities such as: trade, oil business, security interests, security, strategy, and freedom of navigation.

With regard to freedom of navigation, it is clear that a conflict could result in serious restrictions. Therefore, when the U.S. claimed its intention to take a more assertive role in solving the SCS disputes, it was in fact defending its immediate economic and strategic interests. In her speech at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton again highlighted the issue of freedom of navigation as crucial for the U.S.’ interests in the region, saying that “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea”.

Therefore, for United States, the issue of freedom of navigation as a national interest necessitates the maintenance of peace in the region. The questions of freedom of navigation and SLOCs could suffer unimaginable damage in a hypothetical conflict between China and the U.S. or between China and all Southeast Asian countries. This is the reason why the United States supports repeatedly calling for “a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion”. Moreover, with some of the world’s most critical sea lines in the region, through which almost 6% of total U.S. trade and a large percentage of the world’s total trade pass, the Obama administration has very pragmatic reasons to justify the shift of approach in Southeast Asia. In addition, the accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) celebrated by Secretary Clinton in July, has placed the U.S. strategically together with non-regional countries that are already signatories as Japan, South Korea and Australia, as well as China, Russia and India. It is important to highlight the existence of U.S. internal objections towards joining the TAC, which argues that some non-interference clauses present in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation could undermine “U.S. freedom of action”. Critics argue that the accession to the TAC would create barriers in other regional diplomatic fronts, such as in Burma and other U.S. security commitments with strategic allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State reaffirmed the commitments with ASEAN in areas such as climate change, trading, economic integration, democracy and human rights.

In contrast to the U.S., Japan is not in a position to intervene directly in South China Sea maritime territorial claims. However, Tokyo has engaged in important actions at regional multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (Track I) and the Workshop on Managing Potential Disputes in the South China Sea (Track II), which is hosted annually by Indonesia. The Japanese government has important reasons to be concerned about potential negative developments in the South China Sea.

About 70% of Japanese tankers use the South China Sea routes to supply Japan’s oil demand. In addition, 40% of Japanese exports and imports also transit daily through the South China Sea. Much like the U.S. situation, the remote possibility of disruption in these sea lines would stall one of the most important world economies.

Aside from economic matters, there are some strategic matters that Tokyo has taken into consideration with regard to the South China Sea scenario. Tokyo’s active participation in the discussions on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has not reproduced Japan’s performance in the South China Sea disputes. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be seen as an opportunity for Japan to use its diplomatic weight and economic power to positively influence the territorial negotiations in the Southeast Asia. Even though, historically the nations in Southeast Asia are very skeptical about any Japanese diplomatic involvement in the region, an active participation of Japan would provide positive results for both sides, improving the perception states in the region has toward Japan. More than desirable, the participation of Japan in important regional questions has been a strategic imperative. Since the Gulf War, Washington has placed pressure on Tokyo to accept greater responsibilities in regional security matters; the South China Sea strategic disputes would be a timely occasion to begin.

Moreover, Japan is concerned about China’s growing influence in Asia. As the Chinese economy grows, so too does the confidence that Beijing exerts towards securing China’s interests, particularly with regard to territorial matters. Consequently, the frequency of incidents occurring between Chinese vessels and Japanese patrols in the East China Sea has gradually increased. Tokyo assumes that if China succeeds in its South China Sea pretensions, the issue of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands would shift very quickly against Japan’s interests.

The South China Sea is and will be for very long time the subject of concerns in South and East Asia. From different perspectives, the disputes put different power projection intentions on opposite sides. The United States took one step into the question of getting involved with a very thorny regional question. Although alternating ambitions of power projections with episodes of pragmatism, it is reasonable to expect a China payback. The very near future will show us.