Chinese nationalism: affirmative, assertive or aggressive?

Nationalism, in China has its root in the early twentieth century, as an ethnic state-seeking movement led by the Han majority to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. Ethnic nationalism views the nation as a politicized ethnic group and often produces a state seeking movement to create an ethic nation-state. James Harrison (1969) observed that ‘the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defined as ‘culturalism’, based on a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs, not as nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-state’¹.   

After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Kuomintang (KMT) and then the CCP in 1949 defined China as a multiethnic political community. Presently, ethnic nationalism has survived only among ethnic minorities on China’s frontiers, such as Tibetans, Uygurs, and Mongols, who are denied the right to establish separate states. From Beijing’s perspective, these groups pose a serious threat to the unity of a multiethnic Chinese state, and as a result, great care has been taken to suppress ethnic nationalism. 
 

By the beginning of the twentieth century, liberal nationalism was introduced in China as a means to improve China through political and social reforms. According to liberal nationalism, the nation is a group of people who support and defend their nation in the international sphere. After the end of ‘Politics in Command’ or say ‘Ideology in Command’ era of China under Mao Zedong, the post-Mao reforms in the 1980s coupled with Deng Xiaoping’s call for ‘thought liberation’ has created new opportunities for liberal nationalism to gain greater influence in contemporary China. Although, liberal nationalists have identified with the Chinese state in its battle against foreign imperialism, they have not necessarily supported the Communist party, pressing for greater public participation in the political process and challenging authoritarian rule. After the end of the Cold War, liberal nationalists have called explicitly for the adoption of liberal democratic ideals as the best means of promoting China’s renewal².
 

The populist nationalism is a comparatively recent development in China. It began to take recognizable shape after 1996, as a joint result of the evolving nationalist thinking of the early 1990s and the ongoing debate on modernity, postmodernism, post colonialism, and their political implications³. From the late 1989 to early 1992, nationalism was primarily an official ideology. In order to divert people’s attention from the Tiananmen massacre, the government adopted new means to promote nationalism by celebrating the 1919 ‘May Fourth Movement’ and the 150th anniversary of the Opium War, both of which reminds of China’s past humiliation by Western powers. 
 

Nationalism, as a system of belief, an ideology and as a political movement has been one of the formative processes in the creation of the contemporary world. It has been for the past two centuries the moral, normative basis for the system of states. It both legitimates states and has been promoted by states as part of nation building. It has been the justification for secession and territorial claims. It has been responsible for fueling much warfare in the first half of the twentieth century.

The recent rise of Chinese nationalism has raised much alarm. Scholars like Allen Whiting, Strecker Downs, Philip C. Sanders, and Michael Oksenberg have raised question of whether Chinese nationalism is affirmative, assertive, or aggressive⁴.
 

In China, nationalism has reemerged in a big way and has gained foothold in the public domain. This nationalism has caused serious concerns in the Western camps. China has progressed immensely in the economic and military spheres and has left a visible mark in almost all the fields globally. On its way to be the next ‘super-power’, China seeks to balance the use of its ‘rising mass nationalism’. This ‘mass nationalism’ is evident in the form of the large-scale anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. demonstrations on various diplomatic issues. For instance, a large-scale anti-U.S. rally was held in the protest against the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in May 1999⁵. Similar massive demonstrations were witnessed in April 2001, when a collision took place between a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea⁶. Worth mentioning is the anti-Japanese demonstration regarding Japan’s ambition of acquiring permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its alleged distortion of history⁷. The West scholars have come up with the ‘Chinese threat theory’. Scholars, like Peter Gries⁸, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro⁹, caution the influence of rising Chinese nationalism on its foreign policy, stating how it would underpin China’s urge to be a super-power.
 

Therefore, scholars like Ying-shih Yu, sees the rise of new Chinese nationalism aiming at “replacing the dominant position of the West in the world and making the twenty-first century a Chinese century.” Eminent writers like Samuel P. Huntington, James Lilley and Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro all reasserts China’s desire to replace the super-power U.S. and to achieve its vendetta against Japan. Thus, making Chinese nationalism can be viewed as a “defensive nationalism”- assertive in form, but reactive in essence¹⁰.
 

But scholars have differed on the means and developed three different nationalist perspectives: Nativism, Anti- traditionalism, and Pragmatism.

Mainly advocated by traditional elites and at times supported by the people at large.  It is labeled by Xiao Gongxin as “Confucian fundamentalist nationalism” and by Edward Friedman as “anti-imperialist nationalism”¹¹. Nativists stress the revival of Confucian tradition, which constitute the root of Chinese virtues. The dilution of Chinese values due to the impact of imperialism has ultimately led to China’s decay and humiliation. The solution lies in the removal of the external influences. Nativism has lot of weightage as it portrays imperialism as the enemy and its call for national independence is truly appealing. 

 

In contrary to nativism, anti-traditionalism assumes the Chinese traditional values as the root cause for its weakness internationally. Its early advocates were the so-called new elites, including intellectuals in new schools and ‘treaty ports'¹² merchants. They advocated complete rejection of the Chinese tradition and unquestioned adoption of the Western culture. Anti-traditionalism was first expressed in the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and then the liberal intellectuals brought it to the forefront in the early reform years of the 1980s. Rather than criticizing the Communist party of the backwardness of China the Chinese intellectuals began criticizing the Chinese traditions.
 

Unlike the above two, pragmatism considers the foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration as the source of China’s weakness. Pragmatists are the “opportunist” who would like to adopt any approach that would make China strong. As said by Deng Xiaoping, “it doesn’t matter if it is a black or white cat as long as it can catch mice.” This approach is the most dominant. It is instrumental, state-led and reactive. 
 

The Pragmatic leadership of China places the economic development of the country above all. Because the very survival of the CCP depends on addressing the economic needs of the Chinese citizens well. 
 

In respect to foreign policy, the Nativists preaches Xenophobia and an aggressive approach towards the Western powers where by anti-traditionalist attempts to adapt to the modern world by supporting certain foreign models. Finally, the pragmatists fall between these two extremes, they prefer progress of China’s national interest by balancing the external factors. Their policies are situational and they go for both nativists and anti-traditionalist approaches to foreign policy.
 

Regardless of the non-official nature of nationalism and its authenticity, the fact remains that the party still enjoys full monopoly control. Ben Xu states that the party exercises this authoritarian control over the mass opinion through three levels. They are: firstly, ‘the use of coercion and influence’; ‘intimidation and the rule of anticipated reaction’ and lastly, the control exercised by state through media and other institutions of socialization, which creates hegemony of the state and submission on the part masses. And the unquestioned rule of the party lies in keeping the rising nationalism under control. It is certainly not in the Beijing’s interest to allow the emotional, nationalistic rhetoric heard on the street to dictate Chinese policy¹³.
 

Chinese leadership as well as its intellectuals are aware of the negative fallouts of nationalism in the form of expansionist movements and secessionist tendencies. The economic restrains and the fear of political instability are keeping the Chinese nationalism under control. But it is difficult to state that once the apex position in the global economic pyramid is achieved, will China be then able to contain its nationalism from being aggressive? 

 

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