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| The strategic Inner Mongolia
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Chinese development and the transformations in this A.R.. From Xi´an, José da Silva
“In the Year of the Sheep (1211), Genghis Khan launched his campaign against China (…). The time for the fall of the dynasty (Jin) has arrived.
Thus are the Sky and the Earth ordering.”
The Secret Story of the Mongolians (1228?) - Chapter XI, where it speaks of the conquest of China. In China, the classic of the Mongolian literature is also known as the secret story of the Yuan Dynasty - 元朝秘史
One of the ways to get to know the strength of China (and its limitations) is to observe its regional peculiarities and analyze how they are articulated by the state. In this article we enter the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia (to see the photos, please click the PICTURE GALLERY icon at the top of the page), a strategic area for the purposes of development established by the Chinese state. Our path will be centralized on two aspects. Firstly, we will “dialogue” with two historical facts that are determinants in the definition of the present geopolitical design. Then we will ponder on the course of the most recent development, motivated by the diversity and abundance of energy resources.
Known worldwide by the fame of its most illustrious son, the conqueror Genghis Khan (1162-1227), the Mongol ethnic group and other Chinese keep up, since remote times, an almost visceral relationship. Long wars of conquests and domination, sometimes interspersed with some periods of pacific coexistence intertwined their destinies in such a way so that in present times the official discourse frequently uses the expressions “Chinese Mongols” or “Mongolian Chinese”.
A good illustration of the longevity of this relationship is found in one of the main symbols of Chinese cultural longevity, the Great Wall. It started to be constructed as an instrument of defense against the constant invasions by the “Barbarians of the North”, that is the Mongols and Manchu. The Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368), set up by Kublai Khan (1215-1294), grandson of Genghis Khan, deepened this connection even more. And even with the end of Mongolian domination, the intertwining of these relations followed its course.
In a more recent historical period, this intertwining proceeded, intermediated by a third actor. In the case of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), of Manchu origin. Before defeating the Ming (1368-1644) and imposing a new dynastic lineage, the Manchu aligned themselves with the Mongols. This political and military agreement took place in 1638, that is, about six years before the fall of the Ming.
Once this new dynasty was established, this also turned against its own Mongol allies. The development of the confrontations had its high point in 1756, when the last Mongolian resistance was overcome. Incorporated and controlled by the Qing (the last dynasty to control China), the Mongol territory ‘disappeared’(1).
Since then, the territorial part which makes up the Mongol state (Outer Mongolia) and Chinese Mongolia (Inner) became part of a wider territorial group under the control of the same political power. Only with the blossoming of the XX Century, with the fall of the Qing Dynasty did new (and old) demands gain strength for the control of the said territory. In the vacuum of this decay, internal chaos and the new configuration of forces on the chessboard of world power were determinants for the “adjustments”. In a first movement, part of the region was “attracted” to the area of Russian influence (Soviet). The other, to the Japanese orbit, which in 1935 even came to proclaim the creation of the Mongol “State” of Mengjian.
After 1945, the Russian strengthening and Japanese defeat again changed the panorama. As a passing comment, the question on the political destiny of the said territory was one of the important topics dealt with in the historical Yalta Conference in February 1945. The geostrategic interests exposed there preannounced a new political and territorial design for the region. Of the resolutions passed, on the topic of the Japanese question, it was stressed for example, that “the status quo in relation to Outer Mongolia (Popular Republic of Mongolia) should be maintained”(2).
Even though the Yalta Conference had also determined that China should maintain “full sovereignty” over Manchuria, in practice it “officialised” there the division of the Qing inheritance. Even though the course of history has taken care of some adjustments, it is certain that the region came into the second half of the XX century divided into two parts: the Mongol state, under the influence (control?) of the then Soviet Union and Inner Mongolia, which continued under Chinese control.
Briefly, these are the main historical peculiarities which forged the design of the frontiers of the region, as we know today. Put in another way, the present design of the Chinese and Mongol states arises from a group of factors which include more recently the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the civil war, Chinese victory over Japanese occupation and the world political picture, which emerged after the Second World War. With these changes under way, the possibility of new “adjustments” in the geopolitics of the region should not be discarded. But let us leave these conjectures for another moment.
A brief panorama
For a better positioning with the scenario we are tracking, let us remember some facts. Inner Mongolia has a relatively small population, considering the standard of China. About 24 million. Of these, only 4 million are Mongols. The great majority is made up of the Han, the ethnic majority.
Its territorial surface is 1,183,000 km². That represents more than 12% of all the Chinese territory. Its frontiers are with Mongolia and Russia. Internally it is a neighbor of another autonomous region (Ningxia) and seven more provinces. This geographic peculiarity is an important factor for the Chinese development project, mainly if we look to the energy reserves of the region. An integrated network for the exploration and distribution of its energy resources tends to guaranty the supply of a considerable volume of energy for various points of China.
In terms of political division, Inner Mongolia is classified by the Chinese state as an autonomous region(3). This is an important detail. Autonomy here does not mean independence from the central political power. On the contrary. It brings out, maybe for the state itself, that it possesses sensitive peculiarities which demand differentiated policies and forms of control so that its territorial integrity may be assured.
Inner Mongolia took on the condition of an autonomous region in May of 1947. Or rather, a little more than two years before the institution of the People´s Republic (1949). This event was the fruit of an alliance between part of the Mongols and the Communist Party of China - PCCh, in the fight against Japanese occupation. As was the first autonomous region, some see it as a first model of the policies of the PCCh in relation to ethnic and territorial questions. But that is relative, since each one of the subsequent definitions needed specific adjustments according to the political peculiarities of the territories and the interests involved. Furthermore, in the process of consolidation of the new state, in territorial terms, the first objective of the “New China” was to assure what was left over from the Qing Empire. Stated another way, in great measure the definition of these autonomous regions is associated with a policy of assuring, controlling and keeping together the new territorial base of the Chinese state.
Inner Mongolia, a base of strategic energy for Chinese development
In October 2009, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of the People´s Republic, I had the chance to visit Inner Mongolia. The combination of lakes, prairies and deserts form a group of very attractive scenarios. It is not by chance that in many points of the region, tourism is one of the main sources of currency.
However, between one natural landscape and another, a gigantic infrastructure strikes the eye. Long railroads and highways (many are recent) cut through prairies, cross deserts, connect cities and provinces. Large airports signal towards a growing degree of urbanization and internal and external mobility. Immense technological complexes, especially in mining and energy generation areas make up part of the new picture.
Official statistics indicate that in the last seven years the rate of economic growth in this region was more than 17%. That is, it was the region that most grew in all of China (in the last years, the average Chinese growth has been around 9%). This indicator alone is enough to help in the perception of the change in the landscape. But also it can signal that the logic of economic development applied by the Chinese state is intensified in various parts, even in the more sensitive and officially differentiated due to their ethnic characteristics, as is the case with the autonomous regions.
In the case of Inner Mongolia, the principal reason for this robust growth is directly related to the energy question. The region possesses a diversified matrix with powerful reserves of petroleum, gas and coal. In the case of renewable energy, like wind power, this already contributes more than 26% of national production. Considering the national energy matrix, the production of renewable energy is still very low. But as a significant part of this clean energy tends to be directed to the same point – Beijing –, its political visibility tends to be expressive. By improving significantly the environmental quality of a city like the capital, which already is supplied by natural gas from the region, the government will have in hand an important environmental triumph. And, as is known, the pressure on environmental responsibilities is today a constant in the international political agenda.
The investments in the area of clean and renewable energy are ever more robust. For this reason, material occasional conquests must be presented. But illusions should not be created. In China, about 70% of the consumption of energy is fed by thermoelectric generators powered by coal and 20% by oil. It is interesting to observe this index, since even with the powerful presence of China in the international oil market, which completely altered the world market of this product, oil represents, as was said, just 20% of the energy consumption of the country(4).
In relation to coal, it will continue as the main Chinese fuel, at least for a few decades. The motors of Chinese development will continue in their dependence. Also, in this aspect, Inner Mongolia plays a central role. It possesses the largest coal reserves of all China and is already one of its main producers. In 2009, it took over the first place in Chinese production and overtook the province of Shanxi, which for more than 30 years led production.
Concluding, we would further say that in the world of today, however different the models of economic development may be, they have one thing in common: the need for energy. It is the vital force of social working itself, which includes governability. In China, even more so, since economic development is essential for political and social balance. It is not by chance that energy security is one of the priorities of the government. Also it is not by chance that the government has reinforced investments in the defense area to ensure control over its territory. Since not only Inner Mongolia, but also other autonomous regions like Xinjiang and Tibet keep in their subsoil veritable energy treasures.
For this reason, as much as China races to ensure energy outside of its frontiers, its energy security involves necessarily the establishment of trustworthy internal bases. For this reason, the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia has become so material and strategic for the project of Chinese development. On the other hand, its famous oneiric landscape with nomadic shepherds herding cows and sheep through the prairies still holds out. But for the government, it is ceasing to be the predominant symbol of the region. All to do with development, some would say.
Notes:
1. An excellent historical analysis can be found in the doctorate’s thesis Development of Foreign Relations of Mongolia in the First Half of the 20th Century: Mongolia’s Struggle for Independence. Tumurjav, Buyanlham. Japan, Niigata University, 2007. http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp:8080/dspace/handle/10191/6251 (accessed on 20 March 2010).
2. The Yalta Conference, realized em February 1945, was a series of meetings of leaders of Great Britain (Churchill), USA (Roosevelt) and Soviet Union (Stalin). In them, these powers outlined material agreements for a new political order which would emerge after WWII. The documents of the conference can be found in several sites, for example: http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=918 (accessed on 29 March 2010).
3. The five autonomous regions in China are: Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet. In demographic terms, they represent about 10% of the whole Chinese populace, despite occupying 46% of the Chinese territory. From a political point of view, these regions are very sensitive as, with exception of Ningxia, they have extensive borders. The ethnic question (or camouflaged as such) brings about many a political conflict with bold consequences for Chinese international relations, chiefly in Xinjiang and Tibet. In Inner Mongolia, these conflicts are less visible.
4. In2008 China took over the post f second largest consumer of oil in the world, only behind the USA and third largest importer behind the USA and Japan. These facts and a table of energy consumption of the country can be seen in http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/pdf.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2010)
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Professor of Portuguese at Xi´an International Studies University. He holds a Doctoral Degree in Political Science by USP, and a Master Degree in Communication and Semiotic by PUC-SP. Graduated in Brazilian Literature at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte. |
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